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The Truth About Private Prison Control in New
Mexico
Vanessa Brimhall
I. INTRODUCTION
Private prisons directly profit off the incarceration of human beings.1
Specifically, the private prison system impacts society’s financial and moral
compasses, and it also perpetuates the disproportionate exploitation of people
from minority communities for cheap labor.2 According to the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 35% of state prisoners are white, while 59% are Black or
Hispanic.3 Those statistics are even more problematic when taking into
account that 62% of the overall national population is white, while only 30%
is Black or Hispanic.4
Furthermore, private prisons in many states are neither required nor
expected to follow all of the laws and practices that are required of
government-owned prisons;5 this has led to an increase in (1) labor
exploitation, (2) poor and harsh living conditions, and (3) lack of proper
healthcare.6 Though existing studies and data, such as those previously
mentioned, demonstrate the harsh conditions that exist in private prisons,
there are still states with no current or proposed legislation for a ban on the
facilities.

See Lan Cao, Made in the USA: Race, Trade, and Prison Labor, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 1, 4 (2019).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Andrea Castillo, Judge largely upholds California ban on private prisons in tentative
ruling,
L.A.
TIMES
(July
16,
2020,
6:51
PM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-07-16/california-private-prisonsimmigrant-detention-centers-ban-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/V54F-XFY9].
6 See id.
1
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In 2017, Shoaib Ahmed, a twenty-four-year-old incarcerated immigrant
from Bangladesh, encouraged his fellow incarcerated coworkers to stop
working.7 Though Ahmed was aware that this omission of labor would come
with severe consequences, he persisted because those incarcerated at the
Stewart Immigration Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia, are forced to
work under horrific and unfair conditions.8 Ahmed, along with some of his
coworkers, was paid only fifty cents per hour to work within the detention
facility.9 Therefore, when Ahmed was told that his $20 paycheck had been
delayed—something that seemed to happen on a regular basis—he became
upset, leading to his call for a work strike.10 The “crime” of encouraging his
fellow coworkers does not match the punishment that Ahmed received.
Ahmed was placed in solitary confinement for ten days—a commonly used
punishment in the facility that consists of “a cell with no access to other
workers, only an hour of out-of-cell time per day and showers only three
times per week.”11 Ahmed eventually spoke out about the impact that this
severe isolation was having on his mental health: “I think the segregation will
kill me.”12
It is no secret to society that prisons use solitary confinement for various
reasons. However, many people do not agree with the harsh and crippling
effects that the practice of solitary confinement has been proven to have on a
person, even when that person has committed a violent crime. So, it is
difficult to comprehend that a private prison used solitary confinement as a
punishment for a prisoner who committed no harm against another person;
rather, Ahmed’s only crime was speaking out and taking nonviolent action
Azadeh Shahshahani, Why are for-profit US prisons subjecting detainees to forced
labor?,
THE
GUARDIAN
(May
17,
2018,
6:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/17/us-private-prisons-forcedlabour-detainees-modern-slavery [https://perma.cc/9MZP-LRZD].
8 See id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
7
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against the inhumane treatment and conditions found within the moneymaking venture that he was forced to take part in—private prison labor—as
well as encouraging his fellow incarcerated coworkers to do the same.
Ahmed is likely not the first or last incarcerated person who will endure
the torture of solitary confinement.13 In fact, Ahmed and two other prisoners
at the Stewart Immigration Detention Center filed a class action suit against
the private detention facility’s owner and operator, CoreCivic, for violating
the forced-labor prohibition in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
(TVPA)14 as well as Georgia State law.15 More specifically, they alleged that
the “voluntary” work program was in fact not at all voluntary since CoreCivic
coerces the prisoners “to perform labor at Stewart by, inter alia, the use or
threatened use of serious harm, criminal prosecution, solitary confinement,
and the withholding of basic necessities.”16 This abuse and exploitation of
prisoners’ labor as part of the facility’s profit-making schemes constitute a
contemporary form of slavery.17
New Mexico heavily utilizes private prisons18 yet has no current or
proposed legislation for a pathway to any kind of ban. The New Mexico
Legislature should pass a bill forbidding the renewal or creation of
government contracts with private, for-profit prisons to remedy the injustices
against the human beings who have been and continue to be incarcerated in
those facilities. Specifically, the bill should create a timeline for the
eradication of private prison use to eliminate the opportunity for the private
sector to directly facilitate and profit from prison labor and those
incarcerated.
See id.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594–95.
15 Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 951 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020).
16 Id.
17 See Shahshahani, supra note 7.
18 Casey Leins, New Mexico’s Private Prison Use Far Exceeds Every Other State, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 23, 2020, 10:41 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/articles/2020-01-23/why-new-mexico-uses-private-prisons-more-than-any-otherstate (last visited Jan. 7, 2022).
13
14
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II. ROADMAP
This comment will demonstrate New Mexico’s current private prison
situation and why a statewide ban on private prisons is needed. Section III,
Subsection A will introduce general background information on private
prisons in the United States; Subsection B will introduce information found
on current private prison practice in the United States. Section IV will
propose a solution to address the lack of legislation in New Mexico regarding
private prisons; Subsection A will examine California’s legislation regarding
a private prison ban; Subsection B will examine Washington’s legislation
regarding a private prison ban; and Subsection C will examine and propose
legislation regarding a private prison ban in New Mexico using a hybrid
model of the language used in the legislation from California and
Washington. Section V will conclude this comment.

III. BACKGROUND
A. A History of Private Prisons in the United States
The inception of the private prison as an institution in the United States
dates back to pre-seventeenth century England, specifically pre-colonization
of the Americas.19 England originally sought to cut costs relating to crime
and punishment, and by doing so, paved the way for private jailer contracts
and the modern-day private prison.20 The British Crown transported
thousands of criminals to work off their debts to society on cotton and
tobacco plantations—a practice believed to be economically advantageous
while simultaneously reducing crime in England by removing the criminals
and taking them elsewhere.21 This particular practice of criminal punishment,
often seen as indentured servitude, became so popular that it was eventually

Ryan S. Marion, Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment Case Against
State Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY B. RTS. J. 213, 216 (2009).
20 Id.
21 Id.
19
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established in the American colonies as well.22 In fact, the colony of Georgia
was originally established as a penal colony for England’s prisoners and poor
debtors based on the popularity of indentured servitude used by the British
Crown.23
Following the American Revolution in the late eighteenth century, the new
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania continued to build upon these ideas of
indentured servitude by building the first “penitentiary.”24 The creation of the
penitentiary was considered a major and much needed act of reform for
community punishment.25 Lawmakers believed idleness was a contributing
factor to criminal behavior, so the newly implemented labor requirement for
penitentiaries was adopted in hopes of attacking this idleness.26 Although it
was this idea of indentured servitude that contributed to the adoption of the
penitentiary’s new work method, the driving force behind the work method
was supposed to be rehabilitative rather than punitive.27 Therefore, under this
new system, “work was imposed to further the state’s police power objective
of enforcing public morals rather than create a private profit motive.”28
After the Pennsylvania model for penitentiary work became increasingly
popular, a competing model, known as the Auburn or Congregate system,
was developed in New York.29 The Auburn model emphasized a “collective,
factorylike” form of labor.30 In comparison, Pennsylvania-style prisons could
produce only small amounts of household goods while Auburn-style prisons
were able to produce everything from “factory-quality shoes to furniture.”31
During the nineteenth century, more states began adopting the Auburn model
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id.
Id.
Id. at 217.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 218.
Id.
Id.
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as they recognized the vast potential for economic gains.32 The Auburn model
turned “prison officers into factory managers whose main goal was to make
the prison a self-sustaining entity via profit.”33 However, even with the
Auburn system’s more businesslike model, private entities were still
discouraged from replacing the state in its role as the controller of prison
labor.34
The first real instance of complete private control over incarcerated people
and their labor was “convict leasing,” or when a state prison would provide
“convicts” for labor to private contractors in return for a fee, as well as
housing, food, and complete control over the incarcerated people whom did
not receive any payment in return for their labor.35 Southern legislatures
justified convict leasing by using the Pennsylvania and Auburn prison
models;36 however, these models should have been deemed unconstitutional
by the Thirteenth Amendment.37 The Thirteenth Amendment was intended
to outlaw slavery and involuntary servitude, such as convict leasing, but the
Punishment Clause was a loophole that allowed involuntary servitude “as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”38
Since the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment and the post-Civil War
devastation to the Southern economy, Southern legislatures were unable to
bear the costs of prison upkeep and the prisoners were an accessible source
of cheap labor.39 Southern legislatures passed laws allowing prisons to
contract out the labor of their prisoners to plantation owners and other private

Id. at 218–19.
Id.
34 Id. at 219.
35 Neveen Hammad, Shackled to Economic Appeal: How Prison Labor Facilitates
Modern Slavery While Perpetuating Poverty in Black Communities, 26 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 65, 68 (2019).
36 Marion, supra note 19, at 222–24.
37 Id.
38 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
39 Marion, supra note 19, at 224–25.
32
33
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entities as long as they fulfilled their contractual obligations.40 By 1885, 138
prisons had leased over 53,000 prisoners who produced goods valued at
$28.8 million in that year alone.41
Since legislatures created no effective avenues to successfully stop convict
leasing, it was in “full swing by the twentieth century.”42 However, by the
1920s, the system of convict leasing was failing due to white paid laborers in
the general population feeling as if they were “losing valuable opportunities
to the cheap labor provided largely by [B]lack inmates.”43 To address this
problem, Congress passed the Hawes-Cooper Act of 1929, which allowed
states to ban the importation of prisoner-made goods from other states.44
Congress also passed the Ashurst-Sumners Act in 1935, which banned
prisoner-made goods and deemed interstate importation of those goods a
federal crime.45 Except for some Southern states, convict leasing and private
prison operation eventually faded away at both the state and federal levels
after the passing of the above-mentioned laws.46 As a result, from the early
1940s until the early 1980s, there was “virtually no private sector
involvement in correctional services,”47 making it so that the operations and
administration of prisons were largely “delegated to governmental agencies,
authorized by statute, staffed by government employees, and funded solely
by the government” at both levels.48
Nevertheless, in the 1970s, businesses began to lobby to relax the
regulations regarding the use of prison labor for private business.49 The
lobbying for the relaxation of the regulations on private prison labor use was
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id. at 225.
Cao, supra note 1, at 10.
Marion, supra note 19, at 229.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cao, supra note 1, at 15.
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pushed by groups, such as the American Legislative Exchange Council
(ALEC), through the Prison Industries Act and Prison Industries
Enhancement (PIE) certification.50 Through PIE certification, correctional
departments were exempt from the interstate commerce restrictions on the
sale of prisoner-made goods and were even permitted to sell prisoner-made
goods to the federal government.51
In the 1980s, during the Reagan Administration, private prison labor began
to increase.52 The general direction of society following President Reagan’s
announcement of the “War on Drugs” and increased advocacy for stricter
federal criminal laws against the production, possession, and distribution of
narcotics, was leaning toward increased private prison use.53 President
Reagan’s announcement and advocacy led to the passage of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act and the Sentencing Reform Act in 1984.54
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act and the Sentencing Reform Act
eliminated federal parole and established mandatory minimum sentences for
drug-related crimes.55 By the end of the 1980s, the prison population of the
United States had increased by 115%.56
As a response to the quickly increasing prison population, states and
localities were advised to enter into contracts with private corrections
construction and management firms.57 With this response in mind, two
prominent Tennessee politicians, Tom Beasley and Doc Crants, founded
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA).58 By the mid-1990s, CCA and
its primary competitor, Wackenhut Corrections, controlled 75% of the

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
See id.
Marion, supra note 19, at 232.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 232.
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private prison market.59 These companies were publicly traded and existed
solely for the purpose of making profits from prison contracts with local,
state, and federal authorities.60
B. Recent Information on Private Prisons in the United States
More recently, the government’s dismissal of the root causes of prison
overcrowding has led to another surge in prison privatization.61 The drastic
rise in incarceration rates can be attributed not to an increase in criminal
activity—as seen by statistics demonstrating that crime rates have generally
fallen since the early 1970s—but rather to an increase in the use of “get
tough” legislation that has been prominent since the Reagan era.62
Complementing the issue of overcrowding, private prison growth is
dependent upon rising incarceration rates and stricter criminal sentencing
laws.63 In order for private prisons to generate profits, they need a continual
supply of new “clients” (first-time prisoners) and a base of “frequent,
dependable clients” (recidivist prisoners).64 Additionally, private prisons
“make a profit by charging the contracting state or federal government a daily
rate, per person incarcerated, to cover investment and operation costs.”65
Now, several private prison companies, including CCA and The Geo Group,
Inc. (GEO), profit off prisoners’ labor under that same method.66
The history of private prison use in the United States has cultivated the
modern-day private prison establishment process:

Id.
Id. at 213.
61 Lucas Anderson, Kicking the National Habit: The Legal and Policy Arguments for
Abolishing Private Prison Contracts, 39 PUB. CONT. L. J. 113, 119 (2009).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 127.
64 Id.
65 Patrice A. Fulcher, Hustle and Flow: Prison Privatization Fueling the Prison Industrial
Complex, 51 WASHBURN L. J. 589, 601 (2012).
66 Id. at 601–02.
59
60

VOLUME 20 • ISSUE 1 • 2021

335

336 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
First, a state or locality, either by statute or decree, approves a new
prison and solicits bids from private prison companies. Once a
prison company secures a contract, it builds the type of correctional
facility requested and operates it for the government. The latter task
requires the prison company to hire personnel (e.g., prison guards,
wardens, and psychologists) and provide the same services as a
state-owned prison.67
Furthermore, incarceration rates in the United States continue to soar. As
of 2019, the United States accounts for 25% of the world’s total prison
population while only accounting for 5% of the overall world population.68
Private prisons continue to reap the benefits of cheap prison labor provided
by those soaring incarceration rates.69 CCA, GEO, and other private prison
companies are able to reap these benefits by promising to run their private
prisons in such a way (focus placed on cost-effectiveness and safety) that will
result in both government and taxpayer savings in return for governments and
municipalities to continue turning the warehousing of prisoners over to
private interests.70

IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
“We should not be profiting off our most vulnerable communities. Locking
people up should not be a moneymaking venture.”71
Few states have current or proposed legislation banning private prisons,
and many states have not even addressed the regulation of their existing
private prisons—New Mexico falls under both of these categories.72 At this
point, it would be more effective for New Mexico to focus on legislation
Marion, supra note 19, at 214.
Cao, supra note 1, at 3.
69 See André Douglas Pond Cummings & Adam Lamparello, Private Prisons and the New
Marketplace for Crime, 6 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 407, 415 (2016).
70 Id.
71 Lilly Fowler, Washington could become the next state to ban private prisons,
CROSSCUT (Jan. 23, 2020), https://crosscut.com/2020/01/washington-could-become-nextstate-ban-private-prisons [https://perma.cc/6RMC-DRGZ].
72 Leins, supra note 18.
67
68
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banning private prisons rather than on legislation regulating private prisons
since the potential benefits of private prisons do not outweigh their costs.73
Once New Mexico passes legislation for a statewide ban on private prisons,
the focus should shift to legislation that protects those currently incarcerated
in private prisons by requiring better practices be put in place as the ban
process commences.
Both California and Washington enacted legislation banning private
prisons.74 New Mexico may benefit from a hybrid model of California’s and
Washington’s legislation since New Mexico does not already have proposed
legislation in place. By creating a hybrid model, New Mexico would not be
forced to start legislation from scratch, but rather could take the existing
legislation and mold it to fit the state’s particular needs. Furthermore,
California’s and Washington’s legislation would allow New Mexico to start
with a framework that not only includes the eradication and restriction of
current contracts, but also puts limitations on government contracting with
out-of-state private facilities and building any additional in-state private
prisons in the future. The hybrid model will save time and energy, making
the entire process more efficient for lawmakers.
A. The California Bill
California passed legislation in 2019 that restricts the state from entering
into or renewing government contracts with private prisons.75 Additionally,
the bill creates a timeline that requires California to completely transition out
of private prison use by 2028.76 The relevant part of the California statute for
purposes of this comment is Section 5003.1:

73
74
75
76

Infra Section IV(A), (B), & (C).
Assemb. B. 32, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
Id.
Id.
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(a) On or after January 1, 2020, the department shall not enter into
a contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or
outside of the state to provide housing for state prison inmates.
(b) On or after January 1, 2020, the department shall not renew an
existing contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in
or outside of the state to incarcerate state prison inmates.
(c) After January 1, 2028, a state prison inmate or other person under
the jurisdiction of the department shall not be incarcerated in a
private, for-profit prison facility.77
The current Governor of California, Gavin Newsom, strongly believes that
private prisons—specifically those that house California prisoners and detain
immigrants and asylum seekers—contribute to over-incarceration.78 To
combat the over-incarceration, Governor Newsom prioritized passing this
legislation to limit private prisons.79 In addition, other supporters of the bill
regulating private prisons argued that “private prisons are driven to maximize
shareholder profits, lack proper oversight or incentives to rehabilitate inmates
and have contributed to a culture of mass incarceration by making it cheaper
to lock up people.”80
In an attempt to defend the private prison business model that is commonly
used within its facilities, the companies who own the private prisons stated
that “they provided vital extra space when detentions in California’s prisons
swelled to more than double the system’s capacity, sparking lawsuits that led
to court-ordered cuts to inmate populations.”81 A representative of CoreCivic
Id.
Veronica Stracqualursi, California to shut down private prisons and immigrant
detention
centers,
CNN
(Oct.
12,
2019,
12:46
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/12/politics/california-law-ban-private-for-profitprisons/index.html [https://perma.cc/S3WP-32XK].
79 Id.
80 Steve Gorman, California bans private prisons and immigration detention centers,
REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2019, 2:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-californiaprisons/california-bans-private-prisons-and-immigration-detention-centersidUSKBN1WQ2Q9 [https://perma.cc/4DTB-ZAQ3].
81 Id.
77
78
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also stated that “for 10 years, [they] provided safe, secure housing and lifechanging re-entry programming for inmates that had faced extreme
overcrowding.”82 While attempting to defend the private prison business
model further, GEO cited to its record of being “an innovator in the field of
rehabilitative services” and stated that “the bill worked against the state’s
goal of lowering inmate recidivism.”83
Contrary to GEO’s claim, common programs in government facilities—
such as substance addiction treatment, vocational education, and sentence
credits for good behavior—are largely nonexistent in private prisons.84 The
absence of those programs is due to the lack of (mostly economical)
incentives for private prison owners and their need for constant “clientele.”85
Therefore, it is largely unknown whether GEO is truly a leader in
rehabilitative services without the data to back up their statement.
However, CoreCivic and the other private prison companies may still
make a valid argument regarding overcrowding since private prison contracts
are usually intended (and believed) to alleviate prison overcrowding and
reduce corrections expenditures within local, state, and federal facilities.86
“However, experience has demonstrated ‘that the number of jailed criminals
typically rises to fill whatever space is available,’” and privatization has
failed to assist in prison overcrowding thus far.87 Assistance is likely failing
because private prisons and overcrowding thrive only when increasing
together.88 To clarify, private prisons need human bodies to accrue revenue
and overcrowding feeds that need. Private prisons, therefore, have no
incentive to stop overcrowding. Instead, the consistent demand for new

Id.
Id.
84 Anderson, supra note 61, at 130.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 115.
87 Id. (quoting Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: A Violation of U.S. Domestic
Law, International Human Rights, and Good Sense, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 12 (2006)).
88 Id.
82
83
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prisons and jails has facilitated an increase in governmental spending,
corrections budgets, and the prison population89—all of which only benefit
the companies that own the private prisons.
Separately, there is an issue with legitimacy regarding the private prison
system. Private companies currently assume responsibility for the
punishment and rehabilitation of prisoners, but they are not equipped to
perform this inherently public discretionary function since they can only
successfully fulfill this role at the expense of prisoners’ fundamental liberty
interests.90 In other words, a money-making machine like a private prison is
not the right entity to administer punishment nor the rehabilitation of those
incarcerated. The free-market model that private prison companies
commonly use cultivates competition which, in turn, forces better
performance at a comparatively low cost.91 However, this effect is often
undetectable and renders the humanitarian problems that arise under its
schemes invalid.92 Lastly, a study done by the Department of Justice found
that there are 65% more inmate-on-inmate assaults and 49% more inmateon-staff assaults in private facilities in comparison to their governmentoperated counterparts.93
CoreCivic and GEO have been able to take over the private prison industry
with their multimillion-dollar contracts from federal, state, and local
governments.94 Unfortunately, this means they have been successful in
generating revenue for their shareholders at the public’s expense.95 Though
government distribution of public funds to prison privatization may have
initially appeared to be a cost-saving measure, research has shown that the

89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id.
Id. at 115–16.
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id. at 126–27.
Fulcher, supra note 65, at 603.
See id.
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effects have been determined to be increasingly negative and inefficient.96
CoreCivic and GEO “monopolize[d] and manipulate[d] the market” through
the incentivization of incarceration.97 This manipulation proves that private
prison companies are profiting not only off of the incarceration of people but
also off of the government entities that are supposed to provide protection for
those same incarcerated people.
While California’s bill has strengths that New Mexico should draw from,
it has some loopholes that could enable private prison companies to skirt
regulation. For example, the California bill prohibited the Department of
Corrections from entering into or renewing a contract with a private, forprofit prison to incarcerate state prisoners beginning January 1, 2020, but it
does not prohibit the department from renewing or extending a contract to
house state prisoners to comply with any court-ordered population cap.98
Although the intention behind this bill is to abolish private prisons by 2028
and stop the department from entering into or renewing any contracts with
private prisons during the ban process, a loophole exists that allows the
renewal or extension of contracts so long as it is for housing state prisoners
in order to avoid exceeding the population cap.99 The bill also does not apply
to privately owned prisons operated and staffed by the state corrections
agency, creating yet another loophole.100 Loopholes, no matter how
minuscule they may seem, can still perpetuate the private prison system on a
massive scale.
GEO stated that “if AB 32 forces [them] to close its facilities in California,
it would lose an average of $250 million a year in revenue over the next 15
years, plus the $300 million invested in acquiring and setting up those
buildings.”101 These potential losses could be a massive detriment to the
Id.
Id.
98 CAL. PENAL CODE § 5003.1 (2021).
99 See id.
100 Gorman, supra note 80.
101 Castillo, supra note 5.
96
97
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California economy. And, the potential foreseeable rippling effects will
likely affect almost every family, business, and person in the state, along with
any entities that they may be in business with.102 Additionally, GEO
employees and their families will experience devastating effects of loss of
income if GEO loses that revenue. Alternatively, potential positive outcomes
that could come from the state closing private prisons and the DOC operating
them include an assurance of prisoner regulation and administration of
rehabilitation as well as potential job market growth.
Overall, it seems that “AB 32 sent a powerful message that California
opposes the practice of profiteering off the backs of Californians in
custody”103—a belief that the nation as a whole would benefit from if
implementation was required and enforced.
B. The Washington Bill
Currently, Washington only has one private detention facility.104 That
facility is in Tacoma, Washington, and is operated by U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (I.C.E.).105 However, the facility should close at the
end of its contract due to Washington Senate Bill 6442, which prohibits the
operation of a private detention facility in the state and restricts contracting
with any out-of-state private prison.106 The relevant part of the Washington
statute for the purposes of this comment is as follows:
PROHIBITION ON PRIVATE INCARCERATION. (1) Except as
provided in subsection (2) of this section and RCW 72.68.010 (2),

102 See

id.

103 Winston

Gieseke, California ban on private prisons, immigration centers is ‘largely
Constitutional’,
USA
TODAY
(Oct.
9,
2020,
8:38
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/10/09/state-ban-private-prisonsimmigration-centers-largely-constitutional-and-elected-officials-back-cali/5941714002/
[https://perma.cc/S7WD-HE8F].
104 Fowler, supra note 71.
105 Id.
106 See Wash. S.B. 6442.
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the secretary is prohibited from utilizing a contract with a private
correctional entity for the transfer or placement of offenders.107
According to the bill, “there are numerous documented abuses of people
held in private detention facilities in Washington state and elsewhere.”108
Additionally, “incarcerating persons in private detention facilities leads to
cutting operational costs, which is dangerous and detrimental to
Washingtonians.”109 Therefore, an added benefit of a statewide ban on
private prison use is the avoidance of private prisons’ cost-cutting.
The main, overarching issue is that private prisons are first and foremost
profit-seeking entities that are constantly trying to reduce costs in whatever
way possible at whomever else’s expense.110 Because there is a heavy
reliance on profit as their primary motive, private prison companies are
encouraged to disregard prisoner rehabilitation and criminal deterrence.111
Both rehabilitation and criminal deterrence (or “treatments”) require that the
private prison companies put a significant amount of money into them to
make headway on the proven beneficial effects.112 Unfortunately, there is no
incentive for these companies to front the money needed for these programs
to be effective when all that is required of them is to keep their contractual
agreement (i.e., basic housing, food, etc.).113 As previously mentioned,
private prisons need new and returning “clients” to accrue revenue, and topof-the-line rehabilitation treatments would not promote recidivism.114
Additionally, states believe that when private prisons provide contract money
and do not have to worry about salaries for prison guards or maintenance,
they provide large savings to treasuries and accommodate the increasing
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number of people who are incarcerated.115 However, it is incorrect to think
of private prisons as money-saving entities because private prisons not only
profit from their prisoners but also from government and taxpayer funds.116
Lastly, private prisons are perceived as more efficient in constructing and
operating these facilities than their government-owned counterparts.117 For
example, private prisons tend to be considered “cleaner and safer than their
state-run counterparts.”118 Private prisons may seem more efficient in their
operations, but that is likely because they generally severely lack
rehabilitation programs and extracurriculars, which makes it easier for the
private prisons to force prisoners to spend their free time performing “cheap
labor.”119 To summarize, the common cost-cutting practices that private
prisons may abide by allows a portion of the money that should be used for
extracurriculars and rehabilitation programs to go toward facility operations
instead.
Furthermore, those incarcerated in private prison facilities are required to
perform menial tasks for little to no pay; therefore, they are “directly
contribut[ing] to the profit-making function of the corporation” that harms
them.120 In other words, “if the state is characterized as contracting out inmate
labor to these corporations who subsequently aid the prison in earning
corporate revenue, the system begins to resemble a modern day form of
slavery.”121 In fact, private companies have complete control over those
incarcerated in their private detention facilities, and then those same
companies use the incarcerated people to improve the facilities and increase
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profits. This practice benefits these companies’ shareholders and no one
else.122
“Privatization critics note that the profit-based business model used by the
private prison system encourages private prison operators to minimize
expenditures for inmate services and prison staffing, thereby impairing safety
and undermining prisoners’ basic human rights.”123 Compared to their
government counterparts, guards in private prisons have a higher turnover
rate since they tend to receive lower pay and fewer benefits.124 In other words,
“at any given time there are more guards in private prisons who are new to
their facility or to the field of corrections in general, than in public
prisons.”125 That, coupled with the fact that private prison guards receive 35%
fewer service training hours on average than public prison employees, could
lead to major safety concerns.126 Additionally, private prisons operate with
the idea that a higher ratio of incarcerated persons per correctional officer
lowers the prison’s operating costs127—which, once again, enables unsafe
situations. Private prisons tend to “employ 15[%] fewer guards per prisoner
than public prisons.”128
The private prison system exploits unpaid labor that the Thirteenth
Amendment sought to abolish.129 Despite Thirteenth Amendment concerns,
eliminating a billion-dollar industry is unrealistic and potentially harmful
considering it supposedly brings economic investment and jobs to “poverty
stricken rural areas.”130 However, there is an argument to be made that those
are the exact reasons why there should be complete eradication of private,
for-profit prisons. A billion-dollar industry created on the backs of human
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beings who are mistreated should neither exist nor be accepted as
commonplace. The eradication of private prisons would require a more
humane and just strategy to bring the much-needed economic investment and
jobs to poverty-stricken rural areas.
C. New Legislation for New Mexico
New Mexico should adopt legislation to ban the use and existence of
private prisons statewide. This legislation should be drafted using a hybrid
model of California’s and Washington’s legislative language used to ban
private prisons. The proposed legislation for New Mexico should read as
follows:
(a) On or after January 1, 20__, the department shall not enter into
a contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or
outside of the state to provide housing for state prison inmates.
(b) On or after January 1, 20__, the department shall not renew an
existing contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in
or outside of the state to incarcerate state prison inmates.
(c) After January 1, 20__, a state prison inmate or other person under
the jurisdiction of the department shall not be incarcerated in a
private, for-profit prison facility.
(d) Effective immediately, the secretary is prohibited from utilizing
a contract with a private correctional entity for the transfer or
placement of offenders that have not already been placed in the
contracted facility.131
(e) Effective immediately, all current construction of private, forprofit prison facilities shall be terminated, and all future
construction of private, for-profit prison facilities shall be
prohibited.132
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New Mexico holds the highest proportion (42%) of prisoners in for-profit
facilities of any state.133 The shift to private, for-profit prisons was pioneered
by Governor Gary Johnson between 1995–2003.134 Governor Johnson
asserted that private prisons could “offer the same services and goods as the
public prison services at two-thirds the cost,” 135 which led to his proposal to
completely privatize the state’s prison system. He even campaigned on the
idea that prisoners should serve “every stinking minute” of their sentences.136
To further show Governor Johnson’s impact, 42% of New Mexico’s prison
population was incarcerated in a private facility by the time he had left office
in 2003.137 In addition, “from 2000 to 2016, New Mexico witnessed steady
growth in its for-profit prisons, increasing the population by 41[%].”138 Then,
in 2017, New Mexico once again had around 50% of its inmate population in
private prisons.139 New Mexico also continued to “top the nation at four times
the national average of other states that relied on private prisons (twentyeight states total) and seven times the national average (fifty states total)” in
2017.140
In New Mexico, citizens are calling for the state to “divest from private
prisons not only because they help fuel a system of mass incarceration that
has decimated families, deepened racial disparities, and failed to make [their]
communities safer, but also because these corporations are notorious for
abuse and neglect.”141 New Mexico’s reliance on private prisons has
133 Jonathon
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increased greatly in the last couple decades.142 In fact, New Mexico’s
incarceration rates are higher than the national average, with one in every 100
people in the state being incarcerated.143 A study done by the Prison Policy
Initiative found a definite correlation between poverty levels and increased
incarceration rates which has led to “the American prison system bursting at
the seams with people who have been shut out of the economy and who had
neither a quality education nor access to good jobs.”144 It is the corporations
that own the private prisons—such as CoreCivic and GEO—who continue to
push the narrative that private prisons are necessary for New Mexico to
cultivate economic stimulus, specifically in rural communities, and meet the
supply and demand rates for incarceration;145 however, education and jobs
contribute more to dropping incarceration rates and strengthening New
Mexico’s economy and general community than the existence of private
prisons.146 Therefore, “it makes sense to divest from these [private prison]
companies—who ultimately lobby to put more people in jail—and instead
[New Mexico] must invest in [its] communities’ education and economic
development opportunities.”147
A broad issue to consider when dealing with private prisons is that even if
private prisons were abolished, there would still be a problem with mass
incarceration and unconstitutional conditions in government-run prisons.148
The abolishment of private prisons is not going to fix all the problems seen
in the general prison system; however, private prisons are inherently
inhumane and should be dealt with immediately.
142 Uriel
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Private prison facilities are also “linked with quality and safety concerns
resulting from the fact that they have to reduce costs below that of publiclyrun facilities while also generating a profit for shareholders.”149 A private
prison may control its spending by paying staff less, which leads to improper
job training, staff abuse, and lower socio-economic statuses.150 For example,
private prison facilities in New Mexico pay their corrections officers less than
those in public prisons.151 Private prison operators also tend to hire fewer
officers than their government-owned counterparts.152 For example, private
prisons report an average of one officer per 6.9 prisoners compared to public
facilities who report one officer per 4.9 prisoners.153 The private prisons in
New Mexico that have those lower officer to inmate ratios have been
associated with more dangerous conditions such as higher numbers of
assaults and the presence of illicit weapons.154 In other words, these costcutting strategies lead to significant safety and turnover concerns.155
Furthermore, private prisons in New Mexico struggle to maintain a full
staff156 on top of the fact that they already hire less staff than governmentowned prisons.157 For these reasons, New Mexico’s private prisons are
repeatedly fined in excess of $1 million for failing to maintain their required
staffing levels,158 which is in direct opposition to the idea that private prisons
are money-savers.
Another major issue with private prisons and prisoner labor is that a rule
has been put in place prohibiting prisoners from ever being considered an

149 Id.
150 Id.

151 CRAIG,

supra note 134, at 7.
Craig & Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, Abolishing Private Prisons: A
Constitutional and Moral Imperative, 49 U. BALT. L. REV. 261, 272–73 (2020).
153 Id.
154 CRAIG, supra note 134, at 7.
155 See Leins, supra note 18.
156 See CRAIG, supra note 134, at 7.
157 See Craig & Pond Cummings, supra note 152, at 272–73.
158 See CRAIG, supra note 134, at 1.
152 Robert

VOLUME 20 • ISSUE 1 • 2021

349

350 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

employee of their prison since it is believed that “[p]eople are not imprisoned
for the purpose of enabling them to earn a living”;159 thus, with the state’s
permission, private prisons are exploiting their prisoners to make a profit.160
The use of prison labor is beneficial for private prison companies’ profits
since the companies are allowed to pay prisoners low wages or no wages at
all.161 Private prison companies defend the use of low to no wage prison labor
by claiming that the work provides moral, psychological, and economic
benefits to those incarcerated;162 as mentioned in Section II of this comment,
working in prisons has historically been assumed to cure idleness, teach
specific skills, and provide the incarcerated person with a solid work ethic.163
Furthermore, there is a common misconception that the experience of
working should be considered a redemptive end in itself for prisoners,
regardless of their working conditions or whether they are paid a fair wage.164
For comparison, “incarcerated workers in state prisons earn an average of
$0.93 to $4.73 per hour, federal prisons pay from $0 to $4.73 per day, and
private prisons pay from $0.16 to $0.50 per hour.”165 These numbers go to
show that all prisons, including private prisons, are exploiting prisoners for
their labor, especially in a billion-dollar industry.
It is becoming increasingly common to see labels that read “Made in
USA,” when purchasing items in the United States.166 Unfortunately, many
consumers are unaware that this labelling is used as a form of recasting by
the private prison industry.167 The private prison industry uses recasting in
order to characterize the “patriotic return of American manufacturing jobs
from overseas” while not being required to inform the general public at all
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that the “American . . . jobs” they are referring to include the exploitation of
prisoner labor.168 Either way, exploiting low-wage foreign workers or
incarcerated people that work for little to no pay creates monumental moral
and humanitarian issues.169 The United States has very publicly and very
strongly denounced the use of prison labor in other countries, even going as
far as banning the importation of goods made by foreign prisoners, yet it has
simultaneously allowed domestic companies to substitute overseas labor and
“normal” domestic labor with low- to no-wage U.S. prison labor.170
The general argument made by those in favor of utilizing prison labor over
foreign labor is that “prison labor programs offer companies the competitive
edge they need to repatriate or keep jobs in the U.S., because they can
guarantee companies a cheap and dependable workforce [at the cost of
inmates].”171 In other words, “in addition to rehabilitation and preparation for
life after prison, bringing jobs back to the United States from overseas
provides a further justification for the exploitation of prison labor and the
proliferation of prison industries.”172 However, the jobs that are supposedly
being brought back from overseas should not be considered “American . . .
jobs”173 since they are not jobs in the free market.
Private prison companies may also earn profit by receiving per diem
payments from government and municipality contracts, and by receiving
contract payments in exchange for the labor of prisoners.174 Therefore, the
private prison industry is a transfer mechanism of funds for contracted labor
with very little to no economic transfer into laborer-prisoner accounts.175 This
process emphasizes, once again, that these private prison companies are
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exploiting their prisoners’ labor while simultaneously generating revenue
from the government. In addition, the potential for generating such high
revenues from the prison industry creates perverse incentives that contribute
to the high U.S. incarceration rates.176
Aside from the immediate financial concerns previously mentioned,
lawmakers should also consider the long-term indirect financial costs that
arise out of prison privatization.177 One of the largest financial costs of
privatization (typically hidden) is increased criminal recidivism among
prisoners in private prison facilities.178 In other words, the more repeat
offenders that go back to private prisons, the more costly it becomes for the
government. As of 2018, New Mexico prisoners’ recidivism rate was around
50%; specifically for incarceration, each increase in percentage point of
recidivism costs New Mexico $1.5 million per year.179 In response to the
increasing recidivism rates in New Mexico, the Legislative Finance
Committee suggested “legislation that requires the most funding for
community-based corrections programs be used to find evidence-based
programs” in order to decrease the prison population growth rate; however,
no such legislation was ever established.180
Another example of recidivism rates in New Mexico includes the Bayer
and Pozen study, which compared private and public juvenile facilities to
find that a “cost-benefit analysis implie[d] that the short-run savings offered
by for-profit facilities over nonprofit facilities are reversed in the long run
due to increased recidivism rates.”181 The same conclusion holds even when
the noneconomic harms associated with high recidivism rates are ignored and
direct financial costs are the only type of costs accounted for.182 In addition,
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“over-classification,” or placing a prisoner in a higher than necessary custody
level which private prisons are known for doing, costs New Mexico millions
in excess custody costs while also limiting prisoners’ access to the programs
designed to reduce recidivism.183
The largest U.S. private prison companies have spent millions of dollars
lobbying both state and federal elected officials for harsh legislation that
increases the number of individuals sentenced to prison because “private
prisons make money from putting people behind bars.”184 Therefore, private
prison lobbyists seek to influence lawmakers to implement unforgiving
incarceration policies185 since the private prison companies would benefit
from them by incarcerating people more easily, for longer periods of time,
and more often. In reality, the private prison industry is seeking to profit from
increasing the number of bodies that can be locked in cages in the United
States.186 For those same reasons, New Mexico also has a history of detaining
release-eligible prisoners.187 In 2019, there were 156 prisoners eligible for
release and, at current average state incarceration rates, their imprisonment
costs the state of New Mexico $19,344 per day.188 Generally, these releaseeligible prisoners who remain in custody are overwhelmingly in private
prisons, and both GEO group and CoreCivic have been repeatedly fined for
detaining them.189
Several criminal justice scholars and legal professionals have commented
on the benefits of privatization, arguing that competition among firms results
in better facilities for prisoners as well as lower costs to taxpayers.190
However, this general commentary is incorrect, as outlined throughout this
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comment. Furthermore, the survival of private prison companies is dependent
upon the transfer of resources from federal, state, and local governments to
private entities in order to make a profit;191 ironically, these companies’
survival relies entirely upon the role of those they incarcerate (the revenuegenerators).192 In addition, private corporations are not bound by
governmental rules and continue to claim that they are able to get funds
quickly from private investors or lenders.193 For the aforementioned reasons,
private prisons should theoretically be cheaper in every aspect than prisons
funded and operated by the government,194 though research has found that
private prisons increasingly cost the contracting governments more money
rather than less.195 For example, private prison companies have a history of
charging New Mexico with higher than normal prisoner per diem rates;196 a
study on New Mexico showed that a city was paying more than twice the
price of a private competitor’s service.197
Another example of greater costs brought by private prisons includes how
the Johnson administration overlooked an estimated $18 million in fines,
something that may happen more often than realized in today’s society.198
Research has found that private prisons are less safe and less economical.199
More specifically, in New Mexico, incarceration costs are in excess of $100
per day, whereas alternatives to incarceration cost on average $4 per day;200
the alternatives would also be more appropriate for the 25% of the prison
population made up of nonviolent drug offenders.201 In general, when
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comparing incarceration costs at equivalent custody levels, private prisons
cost on average $7,994 more per person.202 Accordingly, New Mexico would
save $26 million a year if it transitioned its 3,258 state private prison beds to
lower-cost public facilities.203 Therefore, there is no real reason as to why
private prisons are still being used and preferred over prisons owned and
operated by the government.

V. CONCLUSION
New Mexico, the state leading the nation in private prison use, should
implement a private prison ban.204 Private prison companies directly profit
from the exploitative nature of private prison labor,205 and prisoners have
little to no say in how they are treated or paid in both the work programs and
the private prisons themselves.206 Studies show that private prisons do not
run more efficiently or effectively in comparison to government owned and
operated prisons, and it is more costly for the government in the long-term to
rely on private prison facilities.207 Considering New Mexico is one of the
leading states for the use of private prisons,208 a statewide ban is vital. The
eradication of private prisons will eliminate the continued exploitation of
private prison labor within the state, and the most effective way to put an end
to this is through legislation in New Mexico that not only bans private prisons
entirely, but also paves a path to their eradication that helps to minimize the
potentially detrimental economic impacts it may have on the communities.
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